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Summary
To make adaptive choices, individuals must some-
times exhibit patience, forgoing immediate benefits
to acquire more valuable future rewards [1–3].
Although humans account for future consequences
when making temporal decisions [4], many animal
species wait only a few seconds for delayed benefits
[5–10]. Current research thus suggests a phylogenetic
gap between patient humans and impulsive, present-
oriented animals [9, 11], a distinction with implications
for our understanding of economic decision making
[12] and the origins of human cooperation [13]. On
the basis of a series of experimental results, we reject
this conclusion. First, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) exhibit a degree of
patience not seen in other animals tested thus far.
Second, humans are less willing to wait for food
rewards than are chimpanzees. Third, humans are
more willing to wait for monetary rewards than for
food, and show the highest degree of patience only
in response to decisions about money involving low
opportunity costs. These findings suggest that core
components of the capacity for future-oriented deci-
sions evolved before the human lineage diverged
from apes. Moreover, the different levels of patience
that humans exhibit might be driven by fundamental
differences in themechanisms representing biological
versus abstract rewards.
Results
When asked to decide between ten dollars in 30 days
and 11 dollars in 31 days, people typically prefer the
larger reward. However, when asked to choose between
ten dollars now and 11 dollars tomorrow, people are
more impulsive and prefer the immediate reward [3, 4].
These inconsistent preferences reveal that people often
*Correspondence: alexandra.rosati@duke.edutrade off between immediate and future benefits. Non-
human animals must also make time-sensitive decisions
about mating or foraging in their natural environments
[1, 14]. Experiments with captive birds, rodents, and pri-
mates [5–10], however, show that many nonhuman spe-
cies wait less than a minute (often only a few seconds)
for a larger, delayed food reward when offered an imme-
diate alternative. Relative to humans, who will frequently
wait weeks or months for larger monetary rewards [4],
animals thus appear to be impulsive over a radically
reduced timescale.
These extreme differences between humans and
nonhumans seem to provide powerful evidence that
patience is a uniquely human trait (as suggested by
[11, 12, 15]). But is this cognitive divide real? Some chim-
panzees can wait several minutes in delay of gratifica-
tion and exchange tasks [16–18], suggesting higher
levels of patience in other hominoids. Two pieces of ev-
idence are therefore required to test the uniqueness of
human patience. First, if our species’ temporal prefer-
ences originated in the human lineage, then our two
closest phylogenetic relatives—bonobos and chimpan-
zees—should make impulsive decisions like other ani-
mals. Second, humans should wait longer than animals
in directly comparable contexts—such as during deci-
sions about food, a currency with more direct evolution-
ary relevance.
We provide a systematic test of these predictions by
(1) comparing the temporal preferences of bonobos,
chimpanzees, and humans in a food task, and (2) exam-
ining human temporal preferences across contexts—
for iterated choices involving food or money, and in
response to more typical discounting questionnaires.
Our iterated task differed from standard economic tasks
in several ways. First, subjects select between real
rather than hypothetical (e.g., [19]) or partially realized
(e.g., [20]) rewards. Second, subjects experience delays
and pay an opportunity cost for waiting because they
cannot concurrently engage in other activities or pro-
ceed to the next decision. Increasing evidence suggests
that both the experience of delays [15, 21, 22] and vari-
ations in reward type [19, 23–26] can influence human
preferences. Nonetheless, the majority of studies inves-
tigating human temporal choice involve low-cost
choices about money, an evolutionarily novel reward
that only humans are motivated to acquire [27]. In
contrast, most animal studies necessarily involve bio-
logical rewards and higher opportunity costs. Thus, by
letting human subjects make decisions about food
rewards and experience delays, we offer a more appro-
priate methodology for comparison across species.
Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Bonobos
and Chimpanzees
In the first study, we characterized the temporal prefer-
ences of chimpanzees and bonobos, determining the
delay at which they chose equally between a smaller,
immediate food reward, and larger, delayed food reward
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Subjects could choose between a small, immediate reward (two grape halves) and a large, delayed reward (six grape halves). Subjects faced the
experimenter (E) through a Plexiglas panel; this panel had hand holes on either side so subjects could insert their fingers to make choices. E sat in
front of a Table (753 403 50 cm) with two sliding platforms (93 12 cm) for food rewards (side assignment was counterbalanced within a session).
Each trial started when E removed an occluder blocking access to the table; subjects then had 15 s to indicate a choice. Subjects indicated their
preference by sliding the choice panel (70 cm wide, 9 cm tall, attached to the front of the table) to uncover either the left or right hole, and then
could access their chosen food option when E slid the platform forward (immediately if subjects chose an immediate reward, but after a delay if
they chose a delayed reward). E removed the forgone option after the subject made a choice. Subjects could take as long as they wanted to eat
the food, and a trial ended when the subject placed the last piece of food in her mouth. E then replaced the occluder; the next trial began after a 30
s intertrial interval (ITI). Subjects in both studies completed no more than one session per day.(as in [6, 8]; Figure 1). Bonobos showed indifference
when the larger reward was delayed by a mean of
74.4 s (standard error [SE] =6 8.5 s), whereas chimpan-
zees waited a mean of 122.6 s (SE = 6 15.9 s), a signifi-
cantly longer period [t(8) = 2.68, p = 0.03, two tailed].
Both species waited longer than did other animals pre-
viously tested in a similar manner [6, 8], including other
primates (Figure 2). Finally, neither species’ pattern of
data can be explained by the short-term maximization
of intake rate over repeated trials, a model that has
been successfully applied to the choices of other non-
humans [5, 8]. This suggests that the apes made
decisions over longer temporal horizons than did other
animals. Accordingly, a long-term rate-maximizing cur-
rency [28], which is more farsighted than most species’
patterns of choice (see [14] for a review), can account for
the bonobos’ preferences. However, chimpanzees are
significantly more patient than expected by this model
(see the Supplemental Data available online). That is,
chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit different temporal
preferences than do other nonhumans examined thus
far, and available models of choice cannot entirely
account for this difference.
Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Humans
and Chimpanzees
Although both ape species waited longer than other
animals for food rewards, humans express a willingnessto wait days or even years to acquire monetary rewards
[4]. Consequently, here we provide the first direct
comparison of chimpanzee (n = 19) and human (n = 40)
temporal preferences; bonobos could not be included
because of sample size limits. The two species made
a series of choices between a smaller food reward
(two pieces) and larger reward (six pieces): In the delay
condition, the small reward was available immediately
and the large reward was available only after a 2 min
delay, whereas in the control condition, both options
were available immediately. The control condition there-
fore measured subjects’ baseline motivation to choose
the larger reward, and assessed possible changes in
motivation due to food consumption. Each human
participant experienced one condition, whereas chim-
panzees experienced both in a counterbalanced order.
We first compared the preferences of the human
participants (n = 20 per condition) and the chimpanzees
in their first test session (to ensure that prior experience
did not influence chimpanzees; delay condition n = 10,
control condition n = 9). Figure 3 shows that although
both species strongly preferred the larger reward when
available immediately (percent choice: chimpanzees =
88.96 4.8%, humans = 77.56 7.4%), only chimpanzees
maintained this preference when required to wait two
minutes (chimpanzees = 71.7 6 6.6%, humans = 19.2 6
4.4%; Figure 3). Condition [repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA): F(1, 55) = 29.16, p < 0.001] and
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Primate Species
In study 1, bonobos and chimpanzees chose
between two pieces of food available imme-
diately and six pieces of food available after
some delay. Stevens et al. 2005 [8] found in-
difference points in a similar manner for com-
mon marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) and
cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus).
Error bars represent standard error of the
mean indifference point for each species.species [F(1, 55) = 18.78, p < 0.001] influenced choices,
but not session half [ F(1, 55) = 0.36, p = 0.55]. An interac-
tion between species and condition [F(1, 55) = 8.73, p <
0.005] showed that although the species did not differ
in the control condition, humans chose the larger reward
significantly less often in the delay condition than in the
control condition, and less than chimpanzees overall
(Tukey post-hoc tests; p < 0.005 for all significant cases).
To confirm that chimpanzees were sensitive to the
delay, we next used a within-subjects analysis compar-
ing individual chimpanzees’ choices across both condi-
tions. Overall, chimpanzees chose the large reward
more in the control condition [control condition = 89.56
3.2%, delay condition = 66.76 4.8%; paired t(18) = 4.10,
p < 0.001 two tailed]. Both species therefore made trade-
offs between rewards and time, although chimpanzees
exhibited greater patience than did humans when re-
quired to wait for the larger payoff (Movies S1 and S2).
Figure 3. Human and Chimpanzee Preferences for Larger Food
Rewards
In the delay condition (study 2), subjects chose between two food
items available immediately and six food items available after 2
min, whereas in the control condition, both reward amounts were
available immediately. Chimpanzee data is from their first test ses-
sion. Error bars represent standard error of mean proportional
choice for the larger reward.Humans might not have waited in the delay condition
because they did not wish to consume larger quantities
of food. Three lines of evidence suggest this is not the
case. First, both species strongly preferred the larger
reward in the control condition—and whereas the chim-
panzees’ preference for the larger reward dropped by
19% in the delay condition, the human subjects’ prefer-
ence dropped by 75%. Second, neither species’ prefer-
ences changed across sessions in either condition,
indicating that the humans did not stop choosing the
larger amount because they become satiated over
repeated trials. Finally, an additional analysis indicates
that their choices in the delay condition were not due
to a lack of hunger (see the Supplemental Data).
Comparative analyses of cognition are notoriously
difficult to conduct because of the inherent difficulty of
equating methodologies across species. In the present
study, chimpanzees and humans might not have faced
identical waiting costs nor had an identical desire for
the food. That said, neither species was food deprived,
both could access food outside the test, and neither
showed evidence of satiation. Altogether, these results
suggest that humans and apes show comparable
preferences when confronted with very similar temporal
decisions.
Study 3: Human Patience and Reward Type
In study 2, human participants showed markedly differ-
ent behavior in response to the iterated food problems
than they do in more typical decisions involving money.
We therefore conducted a third study to assess how
reward type (money or food) and experiential context
(real or hypothetical money and delays) impacts human
decision making. A new group of human participants
(n = 20) made iterated temporal decisions like those in
study 2, but over small amounts of money (20 cents
now versus 60 cents after 2 min). On average, partici-
pants waited on 56.7% of trials [SE =6 8.8%]. Compar-
ing these participants to those from the delayed food
condition showed that people were more than three
times as willing to wait for small amounts of money
than for food [t(38) = 3.839, p = 0.001, two tailed]
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40% of subjects in the delayed money condition waited
every trial to receive an additional 40 cents, not a single
subject did so to acquire more food. Critically, this result
rules out the possibility that subjects in the delayed food
condition did not wait because the paradigm was inher-
ently aversive: Subjects in the delayed money condition
faced an identical situation and opportunity costs, but
were frequently willing to wait for more rewards.
As a final test, we examined all human participants’
(n = 60) preferences on a hypothetical discounting ques-
tionnaire; such questionnaires carry low opportunity
costs for choosing the larger reward. We used partici-
pants’ responses over a series of ten questions (e.g.,
‘‘Would you prefer to receive $31 today or $59 in
150 days?’’) to calculate the hyperbolic discounting fac-
tor (k), frequently used as an index of discounting levels
in such contexts. Consistent with past findings, subjects
exhibited a mean discount factor of k = 0.0116 (see
the Supplemental Data). This value predicts that par-
ticipants would be willing to wait up to 172 days for
60 dollars over an immediate 20 dollars—in contrast to
their more impulsive preferences when required to actu-
ally wait 2 min delays to acquire food or money.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that humans share similar
levels of patience with bonobos and chimpanzees in
some contexts. Both members of the Pan genus pre-
ferred to wait for larger delayed rewards, and did so
for longer periods than other nonhuman animals tested
thus far. Additionally, chimpanzees were actually more
patient than humans when compared on similar tempo-
ral tasks. We conclude that a capacity for patience in the
context of food rewards evolved before the human line-
age split. Based on the comparative evidence, we also
suggest that the last common ancestor of Homo and
Pan possessed an extended temporal horizon for
Figure 4. Human Preference for Delayed Food and Money
Subjects chose between a larger, delayed reward and a smaller,
immediate alternative during an iterated, experiential discounting
task involving either food rewards (delay condition, study 2) or mon-
etary rewards (study 3). Error bars represent standard error of mean
proportional choice for the delayed reward.decisions about food. Because short temporal horizons
could preclude the evolution of sophisticated capacities
such as mental time travel [11] or reciprocal altruism
[13], these findings imply that apes’ abilities to plan for
future activities [29, 30] or engage in flexible cooperative
interactions [31, 32] might have arisen once the con-
straint of impulsivity was lifted.
Higher tolerance for delayed food rewards could have
evolved as a foraging adaptation, and variation between
closely related species might reflect differences in
their natural ecology. For example, the varying levels
of patience exhibited by callitrichid monkeys across
contexts maps onto differences in their wild foraging
patterns [8, 33]. Notably, chimpanzees inhabit environ-
ments characterized by small, unpredictable food
patches with unstable fruit availability, whereas bono-
bos live in comparatively productive environments [34,
35]. Accordingly, variation in habitat has been proposed
as a major selective force shaping the disparate social
behaviors of Pan [36]. We suggest that ecology might
also underlie differences in Pan’s nonsocial cognition:
Chimpanzees may generally tolerate higher additional
costs to procure food, such as increased work effort,
longer travel distances, and the temporal costs explored
here. Notably, there is extensive evidence for hunting
and extractive tool technology in wild chimpanzees
but not bonobos. Their respective temporal preferences
might therefore promote optimal foraging rates in their
different natural ecologies, although not necessarily in
laboratory experiments (e.g [1, 14]).
Though we might share similar patience levels with
apes during some kinds of choices, we appear to have
evolved a greater capacity for patience in other contexts
(as indicated by the questionnaire responses). Why this
difference emerged is not entirely clear. As study 3 dem-
onstrates, reward type is one factor that influences pref-
erences, and monetary rewards have many properties
that distinguish them from biologically central rewards
like food: They are storable, can be convertible into
other reward currencies, might not be immediately
rewarding in the same way that biological currencies
are, and can take on extremely large values. Most stud-
ies of economic decision making involve choices about
much larger amounts than those used in the iterated
task, and reward magnitude influences human patience
[20, 37]. Importantly, the concrete rewards used in ani-
mal studies must necessarily be small, and it is unclear
whether any rewards of relevance to nonhumans could
take on such large values. Furthermore, some level of
temporal impulsivity might be evolutionarily favored in
foraging contexts so that it could be ensured that organ-
isms maximize their rate of gain [1, 14, 28, 38], but rate
might not be a relevant currency for all decisions. In
particular, total gains could be more important when
making decisions about money—especially if the oppor-
tunity costs associated with waiting for money are typi-
cally low relative to the costs incurred when actively
foraging for food.
The human participants’ increased willingness to wait
for money over food in study 3 aligns with previous re-
sults [19, 23] despite the use of very different paradigms.
This suggests that the contrast between decisions
about abstract rewards—or ‘‘cognitive’’ rewards—and
decisions about basic rewards [12, 26] may be quite
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systematically alter people’s goals and behavior [39],
and cognitive and basic rewards recruit overlapping
[40] but possibly distinct [41] neural systems. As such,
human preferences can differ depending on biological
relevance: Decisions about money are not necessarily
representative of all decisions. It is therefore essential
to examine preferences across a wide range of contexts
to fully understand both the evolutionary pressures
shaping human choice and the cognitive mechanisms
underlying decision making.
Experimental Procedures
Study 1: Temporal Preferences in Chimpanzees and Bonobos
Subjects
We tested five chimpanzees (8 to 30 years; three females and two
males) and five bonobos (8 to 23 years; two females and three
males), socially housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research
Center in Leipzig, Germany. Apes had ad libitum access to water,
were never food deprived, had access to food outside experimental
contexts, and could stop participating at any time.
Procedure
Subjects chose between a small, immediate reward and a large,
delayed reward (see Figure 1). Each session consisted of four intro-
ductory trials (forced choice with only one option available) for famil-
iarization, and ten choice trials followed. The large rewards’ delay
was adjusted in a subsequent session according to a subject’s pref-
erences in the previous session (see the Supplemental Data). We de-
termined each subject’s indifference point by comparing the mean
delay to large of their last five sessions with the mean delay to large
of their previous five sessions (as in [6, 8]). Subjects were considered
indifferent when these means differed by less than 10%. The mean
delay of a subject’s last five sessions was used as their estimated in-
difference point (see the Supplemental Data).
Study 2: Comparison of Patience in Humans and Chimpanzees
Subjects
We tested 19 chimpanzees (4 to 31 years; 13 females and six males)
and 40 adult humans. Eighteen participants were from the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany
(mean age: 27.7; eight females and ten males) and 22 were from
Harvard University (mean age: 20.5; ten females and 12 males).
These populations did not differ in an initial analysis (see the Supple-
mental Data), so they were combined.
Chimpanzee Procedure
Each chimpanzee completed three sessions per condition, with the
same general procedure as study 1 (see Figure 1). For each condi-
tion, the first session consisted of 16 introductory trials. Subjects
then completed two test sessions, each consisting of four introduc-
tory trials and then six choice trials. After approximately 1 week,
subjects completed their second condition.
Human Procedure
Human participants completed one session, randomly assigned to
condition. In advance, they were informed that the experiment
would take up to 45 min, and asked to refrain from eating for the
hour prior to the experiment if possible to ensure food motivation.
After obtaining informed consent, the participant and experimenter
(E) sat across from each other at a table. E read from a script (see the
Supplemental Data), informing participants that they would first
complete four ‘‘practice trials’’ (introductory trials), and then make
a series of choices between the two options (six trials like the chim-
panzees, although participants did not know how many in advance).
Participants in the delay condition were not told the delay’s duration,
but experienced it in the practice period beforehand. Participants
then selected their preferred food (raisins, peanuts, M&M’s, Goldfish
crackers, or popcorn). A glass of water was available throughout.
During introductory trials, E placed a cup on the table and asked
how many items it contained (either two or six). In the control condi-
tion E said ‘‘You can now have the food’’ immediately after the
participant responded. In the delay condition E said this immediately
for the small reward, and after two minutes for the larger option.E moved 3 m away from the subject to another chair during the
delay. In test trials, E placed two options on the table (counterbal-
anced for side assignment) and said ‘‘Do you prefer this cup or
this cup?’’ As with the apes, E removed the forgone option
after the choice, participants could take as long as they wanted to
eat the food, and a 30 s intertrial interval (ITI) began when they
placed the last piece in their mouth.
After the food task, participants completed a questionnaire (see
the Supplemental Data) including hypothetical discounting ques-
tions [20] and scales assessing hunger and food preference [25].
Fourteen additional subjects reported that they were not hungry or
did not like the food, and were excluded from the main analyses to
ensure that the food was rewarding for the humans. However, these
individuals did not affect the main results (see the Supplemental
Data).
Study 3: Human Patience and Reward Type
Subjects and Procedure
We tested a naive group of 20 participants from the Max Planck
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (mean age = 27.6 years; 12
females and eight males). Participants completed one session iden-
tical to the delayed food condition but involving choices about
money (two 10 cent coins versus six 10 cent euro coins; see the Sup-
plemental Data). Subjects knew they could keep all money from the
experiment, and were requested to transfer the money into another
cup after E said ‘‘You can now have the money.’’ The next ITI began
when the participant finished transferring the coins. Subjects com-
pleted a questionnaire after the main task as in study 2.
Supplemental Data
Experimental Procedures, three tables, and two movies are avail-
able at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/17/19/
1663/DC1/.
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